Logical skepticism in Hans Kelsen's early work - Núm. 34, Enero 2018 - Anuario de Filosofía Jurídica y Social - Libros y Revistas - VLEX 850234044

Logical skepticism in Hans Kelsen's early work

AutorCamilo Saldías Robles
Páginas123-145
123 Anuario de Filosofía Jurídica y Social, Nº34 (2018), Páginas 121-145
Sociedad Chilena de Filosofía Jurídica y Social
ESCEPTICISMO LÓGICO EN
LOS PRIMEROS TRABAJOS
DE HANS KELSEN
Camilo Saldías Robles
Universidad de Chile, camilo.
saldias@ug.uchile.cl
RESUMEN
Este artículo amplía el estudio
de la lógica en la obra de Hans
Kelsen a través de la identificación
de una aproximación temprana
a esta disciplina en el marco de
la lógica de la época moderna.
Las fuentes de esta aproximación
están en la recepción kelseniana
del neokantismo del Baden
y de la obra de Cristoph
Sigwart. Con la adopción de la
Stufenbaulehre de A. J. Merkl,
Kelsen revela una actitud
escéptica ante la pertinencia
de la lógica para explicar la
actividad judicial ordinaria.
PALABRAS CLAVE
– dualismo trascendental –
dualismo metodológico – ciencia
jurídica –– sistemas normativos
dinámicos – lógica de la época
moderna – neokantismo del Baden.
LOGICAL SKEPTICISM IN
HANS KELSEN’S EARLY
WORK
ABSTRACT
This article extends the study
of logic in Hans Kelsen’s work
by the identification of an early
approach to this discipline
within the framework of the
logic of the modern epoch.
The source material for this
approach can be found in
Kelsen’s reception of Baden
Neo-Kantianism and Cristoph
Sigwart’s work. With the adoption
of A. J. Merkl’ Stufenbaulehre,
Kelsen shows himself to be
skeptical of the relevance of
logic in the explanation of
common judicial practice.
KEYWORDS
transcendental dualism –
methodological dualism –
legal science –dynamic
normative systems – logic
of the modern epoch –
Baden Neo-Kantianism
124
Logical skepticism in Hans Kelsen’s early work
Anuario de Filosofía Jurídica y Social, Nº34 (2018) - ISSN-0719-4455 - Chile
I. KELSEN’S ATTITUDES TOWARDS LOGIC
Over the course of his vast intellectual life (1881-1973) Hans Kelsen’s
thought experienced several modifications, particularly in his attitude about
logic and deontic logic. It is well-known that his visit to G. H. von Wright
in Finland in 1952, where the author of Deontic Logic (1951) remembers,
‘he [Kelsen] already was acquainted with my work about deontic logic and
he considered that it supported his own ideas referred to «contradictions»
and «voids» in law’(Bulygin, 1992: 385). This situation highlights Kelsen’s
interest in logic since the 1950’s. The reception of these ideas is reflected in
the second edition of his Pure Theory of Law (1960), where he held logical
principles of non-contradiction and deductive inference can be only applied
indirectly to legal norms, arguing that norms are not true or false due to their
prescriptive character, so that there can only be logical relations among the
descriptive statements about the sense of such norms (Kelsen, 1982: 88,
214, 255). However, this enthusiasm declined to the point that his late work
is often characterized as displaying a ‘normative irrationalism’ (Weinberger,
1981: 94) or ‘logical nihilism’ (Bulygin, 1992: 387), which is mainly expressed
in a doctrine that confines logical relations among legal norms to marginal
cases, because it states that logical principles are not applicable directly,
nor indirectly, nor by analogy, to relations among legal norms, since norms
are the sense of acts of will (Kelsen, 1973b; 1991). Due to this shift, it is
difficult to establish continuity in his work (Gianformaggio, 1994a, 1994b;
Alarcón, 1989; Schmill, 1978).
Kelsen first referred to the idea that norms are not true or false in Cristoph
Sigwart’s work (Kelsen, 1973b; 1982: 88), and this idea was subsequently
complemented by Jörgen Jörgensen and Walter Dubislav (Kelsen, 1973b).
While analyzing General Theory of Norms (1979), Michael Hartney points
out the constant references made by Kelsen to Sigwart, whose book Logik
is ‘his favourite textbook on logic’ (Hartney, 1991: xiii). Hartney notices that
Kelsen’s knowledge about logic oscillates from one subject to another. Thus,
Hartney states that Kelsen is well versed in the literature related to the logic
of imperatives from the late 30’s, early 40’s and late 60’s, but in the case of
deontic logic, his opinions refers only to the points which are not dependent
of formalization (Hartney, 1991: xiv). In Hartney’s words, Kelsen’s knowledge
about logic is related to Aristotelian logic and obscure texts (Sigwart, Drews,

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