Referencias bibliográficas
| Autor | Claudio Lucarelli H. |
| Cargo | Ingeniero Agrónomo de la Pontificia Universidad Católica, Máster of Arts in Economics y Ph.D Ph.D Economics de la Universidad de Pennsylvania. Actualmente se desempeña como Decano de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales Universidad de Los Andes |
| Páginas | 21-22 |
Libertad y Desarrollo
21
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• Agarwal, S., Driscoll, J., Gabaix, X. y Laibson, D. (2009).
«Stimulus and Response: The Path from Naïveté to
Sophistication in the Credit Card Market». Por publicar.
• Arrow, K. (1963). «Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics
of Medical Care». American Economic Review, vol. 53(5), pp.
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• Asociación de Isapres. (2016). «Isapres 1981-2016, 35 Años
de Desarrollo del Sistema Privado de Salud de Chile».
• Atal, J.P. (2016). «Lock-in in Dynamic Health Insurance
Contracts: Evidence from Chile». Working paper, University of
Pennsylvania.
• Barros, P. y Siciliani, L. (2011). «Public and Private Sector
Interface», pp. 927-1001. En Pauly, M., McGuire, T. y Barros,
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North-Holland.
• Batata, A. (2004). «The Effect of HMOs on Fee-for-service
Health Care Expenditures: Evidence from Medicare Revisited».
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• Breyer, F., Bundorf, M.K., y Pauly, M.V. (2012). «Health Care
Spending Risk, Health Insurance, and Payment to Health
Plans», pp. 691-762. En Pauly, M., McGuire, T. y Barros, P.
(eds.). Handbook of Health Economics vol 2. Amsterdam: North-
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• Butelman, A., Duarte, F., Nehme, N., Paraje, G. y Vergara, M.
(2014). «Tratamiento para un Enfermo Crítico: Propuestas
para el Sistema de Salud Chileno». Informe de Políticas
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• Besedeš, T., Deck, C., Sarangi, S. y Shor, M. (2012). «Decision-
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• Carey, C. (2017). «Technological Change and Risk Adjustment:
Benet Design Incentives in Medicare Part D». American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy, por publicar.
• Cochrane, J. (1995). «Time-consistent Health Insurance».
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 103(3), pp. 445-473.
• Cubanski, J. (2008). «Knowledge of the Medicare Prescription
Drug Benet: Do Beneciaries Really Know as Much as
They Think They Do?». Extraída el 1 de Agosto de 2008
desde http://www.academyhealth.org/2008/monday/
virginiaab/6_9_2008_4_45/cubanskij.pdf.
• Cutler, D.M. y Zeckhauser, R.J. (2000). «The Anatomy of
Health Insurance», pp. 563-644. En Culyer, A.J. y Newhouse,
J.P. (eds.). Handbook of Health Economics, 1A. Amsterdam:
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• Diehl, K. y Poynor, C. (2010). «Great Expectations?!
Assortment Size, Expectations, and Satisfaction». Journal of
Marketing Research, vol. 47(2), pp. 312–22.
5. REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS
• Duarte, F. (2012). «Price Elasticity of Expenditure Across
Health Care Services». Journal of Health Economics, vol. 31(6),
pp. 824-41.
• Dube, J.P., Hitsch, G. y Rossi, P. (2010). «State Dependence
and Alternative Explanations for Consumer Inertia». RAND
Journal of Economicsi, vol. 41(3), pp. 417-45.
• Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Kluender, R. y Schrimpf, P. (2016).
«Beyond Statistics: The Economic Content of Risk Scores».
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, vol. 8(2), pp.
194-224.
• Fonadis (2015). «Segundo Estudio Nacional de
Discapacidad». Extraído el 12 de Diciembre de 2016 desde
http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/endisc/
endisc_publicaciones.php.
• Glied, S.A. (2000). «Managed Care», pp. 707-753. En Culyer,
A.J. y Newhouse, J.P. (eds.). Handbook of Health Economics,
1A. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
• Handel, B., Hendel, I. y Whinston, M.
—(2015). «Equilibria in Health Exchanges: Adverse
Selection vs. Reclassication Risk». Econometrica, vol.
83(4), pp. 1261-1313.
—(2016). «The Welfare Impact of Long Term Contracts:
Health Insurance». Working Paper, Northwestern
University.
• Harris, M. y Holmstrom, B. (1982). «A Theory of Wage
Dynamics». Review of Economic Studies, vol. 40, pp. 315-333.
• Hendel, I. (2015). «Dynamic Selection and Reclassication
Risk: Theory and Empirics». Working paper, Northwestern
University.
• Hendel, I. y Lizzeri, A. (2003). «The Role of Commitment in
Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance». Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 118, pp. 299-327.
• Iyengar, S. y Lepper, M. (2000). «When Choice is Demotivating:
Can We Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?». Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 79(6), pp. 995–1006.
• Ketcham, J., Lucarelli, C., Miravete, E. y Roebuck, C. (2012).
«Sinking, Swimming or Learning to Swim in Medicare Part D».
American Economic Review, vol. 102(6), pp. 2639-2673.
• Ketcham, J., Lucarelli, C. y Powers, C. (2015). «Paying
Attention or Paying Too Much in Medicare Part D». American
Economic Review, vol. 105(1), pp. 204-233.
• List, J.
—(2003). «Does Market Experience Eliminate Market
Anomalies?». Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 118(1),
pp. 41–71.
—2004. «Neoclassical Theory versus Prospect Theory:
Evidence from the Marketplace». Econometrica, vol. 72(2),
pp. 615–625.
—2006. «The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social
Preferences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions».
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 114(1), pp. 1–37.
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