Referencias bibliográficas
| Autor | Rodrigo Troncoso - Louis de Grange |
| Cargo | Ingeniero comercial y doctor en Economía de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Director del Centro de Datos de LyD y Director del Magister en Políticas Públicas de la Universidad del Desarrollo - PhD y MSc e Ingeniero Civil de Industrias (mención transporte) de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Docente e investigador de la ... |
| Páginas | 15-15 |
Libertad y Desarrollo
15
REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS
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